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Fixed Income Insecurities: Municipal Bonds and the 
Erosion of Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny in 
Department of Revenue v. Davis 
Evan S. Weiss  
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court‘s 2008 decision in Department of Revenue v. 
Davis
1
 all but exempted from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny a 
potentially broad swath of state regulations, those that can be labeled 
as favoring ―a traditional government function.‖2 In Davis, the Court 
evaluated whether a scheme that taxed Kentucky citizens on interest 
earned from out-of-state municipal bonds, but not on in-state 
municipal bonds, was valid under the Commerce Clause.
3
 The Court 
upheld the tax scheme, primarily on the grounds that regulations 
favoring traditional government functions are not susceptible to the 
same level of scrutiny as those favoring private interests when 
determining whether a regulation discriminates against interstate 
commerce.
4
 
The Davis opinion could have serious implications for the future 
of the national market and interstate commerce by giving state 
regulations sanctuary from Commerce Clause analysis even when 
 
 
 
J.D./M.B.A. (candidate 2011), Washington University in St. Louis. Thank you to 
Professor Bruce La Pierre for his feedback and guidance in authoring this Note; to Professors 
David Becker and Ann Davis Shields for their continued mentorship; to the faculty and staff of 
Washington University; and to the editorial board of the Journal of Law & Policy. Thank you 
also to my wife and family for their unwavering support. It is to them, and to my beloved son, 
Dylan, that I dedicate this work. 
 1. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 1811. It is debatable whether this traditional government functions test differs 
from that of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), which was later 
deemed unworkable. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 3. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1804. 
 4. See id. at 1810 & nn.8–9. 
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those regulations are protectionist of intrastate economic interests. 
This Note will evaluate the tax scheme at issue in Davis under 
traditional dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. In doing so, it will 
demonstrate that the tax scheme did not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, because the costs of the regulation were born by 
the citizens of the state itself. Therefore, application of a traditional 
government functions exemption becomes unnecessary. This Note 
asserts that the Davis exemption for traditional government functions 
needlessly erodes the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Before one can fully understand the implications of the Davis 
opinion for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine—along with its 
predecessor, United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid 
Waste Management Authority
5—it is important to first recognize the 
purpose that the doctrine serves and the reasons for the tests used to 
enforce it. 
The Constitution‘s Commerce Clause grants Congress the 
affirmative power to ―regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States . . . .‖6 Under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the same provision as also limiting the 
authority of states to ―erect barriers against interstate trade.‖7 This 
limitation does not completely prevent states from using their powers 
in any and every manner that affects interstate commerce.
8
 States 
retain the right to use their general police powers to regulate matters 
of local concern.
9
 
 
 5. United Haulers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330 (2007). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 7. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980). 
 8. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976); H. P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531–32 (1949). 
 9. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 & n.15 (1978); Great 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 424 U.S. at 370–71. 
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A. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Supreme Court and legal scholars‘ justifications for the 
dormant Commerce Clause express the limitations it imposes. The 
first justification is that granting Congress affirmative power to 
regulate commerce implicitly negates the same power in the states.
10
 
Another justification for the dormant Commerce Clause is that when 
Congress has not regulated a particular aspect of interstate commerce, 
its inaction implies a conscious determination to leave the subject 
unregulated.
11
 A third justification, and the one generally adopted by 
the Court, is to ensure that state regulations do not undermine the 
objectives that the Commerce Clause was designed to serve.
12
  
Applying the rationale that regulations should not undermine the 
objectives of the Commerce Clause, the most significant of those 
 
 10. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 582 (1987). This view underlies the 
remarks of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, where he stated: 
It has been contended . . . that, as the word ―to regulate‖ implies in its nature, full 
power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others 
that would perform the same operation on the same thing. . . . There is great force in 
this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted. 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824). Although Gibbons was decided on federal 
preemption grounds, Justice Marshall‘s opinion is recognized as the foundation upon which all 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis stands. See Norman R. Williams, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause: Why Gibbons v. Ogden Should be Restored to the Canon, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 817, 
817–21 (2005). 
 11. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 10, at 582. This theory argues that if the power to 
regulate interstate commerce is vested entirely in Congress, it is the prerogative of Congress to 
leave that matter unregulated. See id. There is also a degree of pragmatism associated with this 
argument. If states were free to enact any regulation affecting commerce in the absence of 
action by Congress, the federal legislature would be forced to react to all state regulations 
inconsistent with its policies for regulating interstate commerce. See id. at 588–90.  
 12. See BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. at 35. It is worth noting that there have also been 
arguments attacking the validity of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in its entirety—
attacks that have come from Supreme Court Justices and scholars alike. See, e.g., United 
Haulers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (―The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution and 
has proved unworkable in practice. . . . [A]pplication of the negative Commerce Clause turns 
solely on policy considerations, not on the Constitution. Because this Court has no policy role 
in regulating interstate commerce, I would discard the Court's negative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.‖); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847) (holding that 
state regulations of interstate commerce are valid unless in conflict with federal legislation); 
Redish & Nugent, supra note 10, at 617. 
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objectives fall under the broad category of promoting national unity 
through economic integration.
13
 At the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, the lack of such integration was viewed as a significant 
failure of the Articles of Confederation that a new constitution should 
remedy.
14
 Under this rubric of promoting national unity, the Court 
has struck down state laws affecting interstate commerce by utilizing 
four different justifications: ensuring uniform regulation;
15
 promoting 
 
 13. See Williams, supra note 10, at 817; Jennifer L. Larsen, Student Article, 
Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 844, 846–47 (2004). 
 A commonly cited articulation that national economic solidarity is a chief concern of the 
Commerce Clause, as well as a principle justification for the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, is Justice Jackson‘s opinion for the Court in Hood & Sons v. Du Mond: 
While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the 
states, it does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of 
congressional action, nor how to draw the line between what is and what is not 
commerce among the states. Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written 
word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the 
meaning it has given to these great silences of the Constitution . . . . This Court 
consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to advance their own commercial interests 
by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state, 
while generally supporting their right to impose even burdensome regulations in the 
interest of local health and safety. 
336 U.S. at 534–35; see also Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (stating 
that the Constitution ―was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must 
sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not 
division‖).  
 14. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison advocated for federal regulation of interstate 
commerce in The Federalist, citing lack of such power as a significant weakness of the 
Confederation. Hamilton stated, ―there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or 
finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence [than the power to regulate 
commerce]. The want of it . . . has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the states.‖ THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). Similarly, Madison contended:  
The defect of power in the existing confederacy, to regulate the commerce between its 
several members, is in the number of these which have been clearly pointed out by 
experience . . . . A very material object of this power was the relief of the states which 
import and export through other states, from the improper contributions levied on them 
by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between state and state, as must 
be foreseen, that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, 
during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the 
makers of the latter, and the consumers of the former. We may be assured, by past 
experience, that such a practice . . . would nourish unceasing animosities, and not 
improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity [sic]. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 15. The Court addressed the need for uniformity of regulation in cases dealing with rail 
and truck transportation rules as well as price control regulations. These cases, particularly the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/11
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a national free market;
16
 minimizing political friction between and 
among states;
17
 and, above all, avoiding economic protectionism.
18
 
An additional rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
has been to prevent states from regulating those beyond their borders 
to whom they are not politically accountable.
19
 
B. Testing the Validity of a State Regulation under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
Over nearly 200 years, the Court has applied varying tests to 
evaluate the validity of a state regulation under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, some of them more effective than others for 
 
transportation cases, demonstrated a concern that inconsistent regulation could hinder the free 
flow of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways 
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); S. Pac. 
Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 16. The promotion of a national free market and a concern about economic balkanization 
emerges in such cases as Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (―States may promote 
[a] legitimate purpose only in ways consistent with the basic principle that ‗our economic unit is 
the Nation‘ . . . .‖ (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 537)) and H.P. Hood & Sons, 
Inc., 336 U.S. 525. As explained by Justice Jackson in Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,  
[o]ur system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged . . . by the certainty that he will have free access to 
every market in the Nation . . . . Likewise, every consumer may look to the free 
competition from every producing area in the Nation . . . . Such was the vision of the 
Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.  
Id. at 539. 
 17. Justice Cardozo expressed concern about friction among states in Baldwin v. G. A. F. 
Seelig, where he remarked, ―If New York . . . may guard [its farmers] against competition with 
the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were 
meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the nation.‖ 294 
U.S. at 522. Similarly, Justice Jackson stated in Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, ―We need only 
consider the consequences if each of the few states that produce copper, lead, high-grade iron 
ore, timber, cotton, oil or gas should decree that industries located in that state should have 
priority. What fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals would ensue if such practices 
were begun!‖ 336 U.S. at 538–39; see also Michael E. Smith, State Discrimination against 
Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1986). 
 18. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–73 (1984); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 434, 443 (1879). 
 19. See Smith, supra note 17, at 1209; Larsen, supra note 13, at 849. Yet another 
rationale, economic liberty, is implicit in some dormant Commerce Clause opinions, but is not 
dealt with explicitly by the Court. See Bruce F. Broll, Student Article, The Economic Liberty 
Rationale in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 824 (2004). 
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delineating between valid applications of police power and invalid 
regulations of interstate commerce. Those tests have included 
inquiries into (1) whether the state had actually attempted to regulate 
interstate commerce;
20
 (2) whether the subject being regulated is one 
that calls for national uniformity of regulation and therefore cannot 
be regulated by the states;
21
 (3) whether the effect of the state 
regulation on interstate commerce is direct or indirect;
22
 (4) whether 
the purpose of the regulation was a legitimate concern of the police 
power or rather a protectionist measure against out-of-state 
competition;
23
 (5) whether the state regulation discriminated against 
or merely burdened interstate commerce;
24
 and (6) whether the state 
interest in the particular regulation outweighed the national interests 
in uniform regulation and the free flow of commerce.
25
 
Ultimately, the Court settled on a two-part test consisting of a 
hybrid of the discriminatory-burdensome test and the state-versus-
national-interests test. Under this two-part test, the Court first 
evaluates whether the state regulation in question discriminates 
against or merely burdens interstate commerce.
26
 Second, the Court 
weighs the interests of the state against the interests of the nation.
27
 If 
the regulation discriminates against interstate commerce, the Court 
applies the Hunt test, whereby the regulation will be deemed invalid 
unless the state can demonstrate a compelling interest for upholding it 
 
 20. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). This inquiry 
comports with the rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause espoused by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden that the Constitution grants Congress alone, and not the states, 
the authority to regulate interstate commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 
(1824); see supra note 10. 
 21. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
 22. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917); S. Ry. Co. v. King, 217 
U.S. 524 (1910); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888). 
 23. See Bradley v. Pub. Utils. Comm‘n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933). This inquiry, although not 
used explicitly, was also influential on the Court‘s opinion in Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 
(1925). 
 24. See S.C. State Highway Dep‘t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
 25. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo 
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 
(1945). 
 26. See United Haulers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 338 (2007). 
 27. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
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irrespective of national economic interests.
28
 If the regulation merely 
burdens interstate commerce, the Court evokes the Pike test, whereby 
the regulation will be upheld unless the national interests outweigh 
those of the state.
29
 
The initial determination of whether the regulation is 
discriminatory is highly significant, because the Court applies strict 
scrutiny to discriminatory regulations.
30
 Therefore, an appropriate 
measure of what constitutes discrimination against interstate 
commerce is crucial to dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The 
common concern underlying each inquiry is whether the state is 
favoring in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state interests.
31
 
The Court has recognized state discrimination against interstate 
commerce where the regulation in question is discriminatory on its 
face, in its effects, or in its purpose.
32
 
 
 28. ―When discrimination against commerce . . . is demonstrated, the burden falls on the 
State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the 
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at 
stake.‖ Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). 
 29. ―Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.‖ Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 30. ―Discriminatory laws motivated by ‗simple economic protectionism‘ are subject to a 
‗virtually per se rule of invalidity.‘‖ United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338 (citing Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
 31. ―‗[D]iscrimination‘ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.‖ United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 
338 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); New Energy 
Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)). 
 32. See Smith, supra note 17, at 1239–44. An example of facial discrimination is Hughes 
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323, 336 (1979) (involving regulation that prohibited the 
transportation or shipment of minnows ―seined or procured within the waters‖ of Oklahoma for 
the purpose of selling them outside the state (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 29 § 4–115(B) (Supp. 
1978))). For examples of cases involving discriminatory purpose, compare Buck v. Kuykendall 
267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925) (invalidating a regulation the purpose of which is prohibiting 
competition), with Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission, 289 U.S. 92, 96 (1993) (upholding 
as valid those regulations deemed necessary to promote public safety). See also Kassel v. 
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677 (1981) (finding evidence of discriminatory 
purpose to limit interstate traffic through Iowa based on comments of governor). For examples 
of cases measuring discriminatory effects, see Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 
350, 354, 356 (1951) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk unless bottled within 
five miles of the central square of Madison), and Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333 (concerning a North 
Carolina statute requiring that all apples sold or shipped into North Carolina in closed 
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The discriminatory effects test has emerged as the most useful of 
the three tests for discriminatory legislation. Facial discrimination 
alone cannot suffice as a measure of discrimination, because a state 
intent on discriminating against interstate commerce can simply 
adopt measures that appear to treat in-state and out-of-state interests 
equally, even though all of the burdens actually fall out of state.
33
 
Conversely, there may be instances in which a regulation appears 
discriminatory on its face but upon further analysis proves not to be.
34
 
Evaluating whether the regulation is discriminatory in purpose may 
be the most intuitive measure of discrimination, given that the 
overarching concern is whether the state is using its police powers to 
regulate legitimate local concerns or rather to enact protectionist 
measures that will undermine national unity.
35
 However, only in rare 
instances will clear evidence of the motives behind enactment of a 
regulation be readily ascertainable.
36
 The most effective test of 
discrimination is the discriminatory effects test.
37
 This test makes 
particular sense, considering that the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is primarily concerned with ensuring that states not obstruct 
the results that the Commerce Clause was designed to secure.
38
 
To evaluate whether the effects of a state regulation are 
discriminatory, the appropriate analysis is to determine whether the 
most palpable burden of the regulation is born by those in the state or 
those beyond the state‘s borders.39 A comment from Justice Stone—
predating the test, but from which the test is derived—explains that 
―when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls 
principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not 
likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally 
 
containers be identified by no grade on the container other than the applicable federal grade or a 
designation that the apples are not graded). 
 33. See Smith supra note 17, at 1240. 
 34. Id. As this Note will demonstrate, Davis is arguably such a case. See infra notes 74–82 
and accompanying text. 
 35. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Smith, supra note 17, at 1242; Larsen, supra note 13, at 859.  
 37. Smith, supra note 17, at 1249. 
 38. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 10, at 582. 
 39. Even the United Haulers Court paid lip service to this test while failing to apply it. 
United Haulers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 345 
(2007). See infra note 48 and accompanying text.  
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exerted on legislation where it adversely affects some interests within 
the state.‖40 In light of Justice Stone‘s remarks, the most palpable 
burden test addresses several concerns of the Commerce Clause. It 
discourages economic protectionism by requiring in-state interests to 
carry the burdens of state regulations.
41
 It minimizes political friction 
between and among states by compelling state regulators to consider 
potentially adverse consequences of their regulatory measures.
42
 
Furthermore, it prevents states from regulating those beyond their 
borders to whom they are not politically accountable, essentially by 
giving voice to out-of-state concerns through in-state disaffected 
constituents.
43
 
C. The Davis Exemption for Regulations Supporting Government 
Entities 
In 2007, the Court issued its opinion in United Haulers, upon 
which the Davis opinion was based.
44
 In United Haulers, the Court 
upheld as nondiscriminatory a county flow control ordinance that 
required all solid waste generated within Oneida and Herkimer 
Counties to be delivered to a government owned and operated waste-
processing site.
45
 In so doing, the Court deemed it significant that the 
regulation favored a government entity rather than private business.
46
 
It held that ordinances favoring a government entity yet treating ―in-
state private business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, 
do not ‗discriminate against interstate commerce‘ for purposes of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.‖47 
In United Haulers, however, the Court did not abandon entirely 
the most palpable burden test. The Court noted that ―it bears 
 
 40. S.C. State Highway Dep‘t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. Not all justices agree that the most palpable burden test is the appropriate test 
for discrimination. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  
 44. ―It follows a fortiori from United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail.‖ Dep‘t of 
Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008). 
 45. United Haulers, 550 U.S. 330. 
 46. Id. at 343–44. 
 47. Id. at 345 (citation omitted). 
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mentioning that the most palpable harm imposed by the ordinances 
. . . is likely to fall upon the very people who voted for the laws . . . . 
Here, the citizens and businesses of the Counties bear the costs of the 
ordinances.‖48 In short, the United Haulers Court went to great 
lengths to differentiate regulations favoring government entities from 
those favoring private ones even though the regulations were already 
nondiscriminatory on the basis of the most palpable burden test.
49
 
This extensive discussion of regulations favoring government 
versus private entities was necessary to distinguish the holding in 
United Haulers from a contrary outcome in a nearly identical case, C 
& A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown.
50
 In Carbone, the Court had struck 
down as discriminatory a flow control ordinance requiring all solid 
waste to be processed at a facility in Clarkstown.
51
 The only basis 
upon which the Court was able to distinguish the ordinance at issue in 
United Haulers from that of Carbone was that the former required 
the waste to be processed at a publicly-owned facility while the latter 
required waste to be processed at a private facility.
52
 However, the 
 
 48. Id. Because the flow control ordinances required that all waste be delivered to one 
waste processing facility, the counties prevented trash haulers from seeking out competitor 
facilities, either in-state or out-of-state, with lower ―tipping fees‖—disposal charges levied by a 
processing facility against the waste collectors who drop off waste at the facility. Id. at 335–37. 
Due to the monopoly that the ordinances granted to the publicly operated processing facility, 
the waste haulers were forced to accept tipping fees that in some instances were more than 
twice the rates of competitor facilities. Id. at 337. Presumably, these costs were passed through 
to the tax-paying general public, who therefore bore the burden of the regulation in the form of 
increased costs of waste removal. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810–11. 
 49. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343–44.  
 50. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). In Carbone, the Court 
examined a flow control ordinance just like that in United Haulers, except that the ordinance in 
Carbone required disposal at a private, not public, processing facility. Id. at 387. Because the 
ordinances at issue in Carbone and United Haulers were nearly identical, the Court could not 
uphold the ordinances in United Haulers on the basis of the most palpable burden test alone. 
Rather, the Court was compelled to distinguish United Haulers from Carbone, lest it be forced 
to overturn Carbone altogether. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 339–41. The result was the 
elaborate discussion in United Haulers of the reasons for treating public and private entities 
differently for purposes of evaluating whether a state regulation is discriminatory. Id. at 342–
45. 
 51. Carbone, 511 U.S. 383. 
 52. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334 (―The only salient difference [between the two 
ordinances] is that the laws at issue here require haulers to bring waste to facilities owned and 
operated by a state-created public benefit corporation.‖) (emphasis added). Even that 
distinction, however, is superficial. The facility in Carbone was to be constructed and operated 
by a private developer for five years, after which the government would purchase the facility 
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Court‘s mention in United Haulers that the ordinance would not have 
been discriminatory under the most palpable burden test is tacit 
recognition that the holding in Carbone was wrong. In both instances, 
the local population would bear the costs of the ordinance.
53
 But 
rather than overturn Carbone, the Court introduced the traditional 
governmental functions exemption to dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny.
54
 
One year after United Haulers, the Court issued its opinion in 
Davis, addressing a Kentucky state tax scheme in which the state 
granted residents an exemption from taxation on interest from in-state 
municipal bonds yet taxed them interest earned on out-of-state 
municipal bonds.
55
 States presumably implement tax schemes like 
that of Kentucky to make their municipal bonds more competitive 
with respect to taxable bonds of comparable risk that yield a higher 
interest rate.
56
 As of 2008, forty-one states, including Kentucky, had 
 
for one dollar. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387. The ordinance was designed to generate sufficient 
revenues to make the deal worthwhile for the developer, with the town agreeing to cover any 
deficit. Id. The ordinances thus supported a facility that was private in form only, not in 
substance. 
 53. See supra note 48. 
 54. United Haulers, 55 U.S. at 343–44.  
 55. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804–05 (2008). The Kentucky statute 
imposes an annual tax on its residents‘ ―net income‖ in accordance with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
Section 141.020(1) (LexisNexis 2006). Net income is calculated in reference to ―gross income‖ 
as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(9)-(11) (2006 
LexisNexis Supp. 2009); see also 12 U.S.C. § 61 (2006). Gross income, under the Internal 
Revenue Code, excludes interest on any state or local bond (i.e., municipal bond). 26 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a). However, in calculating net income, Kentucky statute reinserts into the equation 
―interest income derived from obligations of sister states and political subdivisions thereof 
. . . .‖ KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10)(c) (2006 & LexisNexis Supp. 2009). 
 Prior to Davis, the Court had struck down numerous state taxes that it viewed as favoring 
in-state over out-of-state products, activities, or enterprises. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 
516 U.S. 325 (1996) (overturning a state tax on intangible property favoring investment in in-
state over out-of-state corporations); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) 
(striking down an income tax credit limited to corporations engaging in export-related activity 
from within the state); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating an excise 
tax on liquor from which locally produced beverages were exempt). 
 56. See Brief of the National Ass‘n of State Treasurers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 4, Dep‘t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666). For example, 
consider a municipality that wants to issue bonds to pay for improvements to its high school. 
Assume that the prevailing market interest rate on a bond of comparable risk is ten percent. A 
bond purchaser living in the state where the municipality is located could purchase a $1000 
bond at the market rate and earn $100 in the first year. If that bond purchaser pays an eight 
percent state income tax, he will be taxed $8 on his $100 income, reducing his after-tax 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
340 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:329 
 
 
laws similar to the one at issue in Davis.
57
 Moreover, states have been 
enacting such measures since the early twentieth century.
58
 
As of the end of 2006, approximately $2.4 trillion in federal tax-
exempt municipal bonds were outstanding.
59
 While the market for 
those bonds is diverse and complex, they are all issued by state and 
local government to ―finance expenditures that address public 
needs.‖60 Those needs include essential government services, 
operating requirements, and public works projects and programs.
61
 
Between 1996 and 2002, Kentucky and its subdivisions issued $7.7 
billion in long-term municipal bonds.
62
 Given the wide use of the tax 
scheme at issue in Davis and the vast size of the municipal bond 
market, the potential ramifications of deeming the tax scheme 
unconstitutional were severe. 
The Davises, Kentucky taxpayers who paid state income tax on 
interest derived from out-of-state municipal bonds, sued the state tax 
collectors for a tax refund on the grounds that the differential tax 
scheme unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate 
 
earnings to $92. But, if the state exempts interest earned on in-state municipal bonds, the 
municipality can pay 9.2 percent interest on the bond, rather than the market rate of ten percent, 
and the bond purchaser will earn the same after-tax return of $92 on his $1000 bond. If the 
municipality were to pay 9.5 percent interest, then its bond would become more competitive 
than market rate bonds, because the municipal bond would earn the purchaser $95 in after-tax 
returns, while market rate bonds subject to state income tax would earn the purchaser only $92. 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 212–15 (4th ed. 2001). 
 57. 128 S. Ct. at 1806–07. Of the forty other states with tax schemes like the one at issue 
in Davis, thirty-six were nearly identical to that of Kentucky. Id. at 1807 n.7. The other four 
states tax out-of-state municipal bonds and exempt some, but not all, in-state municipal bonds. 
Id. Of the nine states that do not have statues similar to that of Kentucky, Utah exempts its own 
bonds and only exempts the out-of-state bonds of those states that do not tax Utah bonds; 
Indiana exempts all municipal bonds from taxation; and the other seven states have no personal 
income tax. Id. 
 58. New York enacted the first such tax exemption in 1919, the same year it began 
imposing an income tax. Id. at 1806 (citing 1919 N.Y. Laws 1641–1642; ALZADA COMSTOCK, 
STATE TAXATION OF PERSONAL INCOMES 104 (Columbia University 1921) (reprinted 2005)). 
 59. Brief for the National Federation of Municipal Analysts as Amicus Curiae, in Support 
of Neither Party at 10, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666) (citing SECURITIES INDUS. AND FIN. 
MARKETS ASS‘N, HOLDERS OF MUNICIPAL BOND SECURITIES, http://www.sifma.org/research/ 
pdf/Holders_Municipal_Securities.pdf). 
 60. Id. at 4; see also Brief of the National Ass‘n of State Treasurers, supra note 56, at 3. 
 61. Brief of the National Ass‘n of State Treasurers, supra note 56, at 3. 
 62. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1806 (citing CYNTHIA BELMONTE, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 1996–
2002, 169–70, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02govbnd.pdf). 
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commerce.
63
 In 2004, the trial court granted the state‘s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the tax scheme was constitutional 
because it had a ―reasonable, legitimate public purpose.‖64 The 
Kentucky Court of Appeals vacated the trial court‘s order in 2006, 
finding that none of the exemptions for facially discriminatory 
regulations applied to the Kentucky tax scheme and concluded that 
―we have no choice but to find that Kentucky‘s system of taxing only 
extraterritorial bonds runs afoul of the Commerce Clause.‖65 The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky denied the state‘s motion for 
discretionary review.
66
 
In 2008, the Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals. First, the Court deemed the tax scheme nondiscriminatory, 
stating that ―Kentucky‘s tax exemption favors a traditional 
government function without any differential treatment favoring local 
[private] entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests.‖67 
According to the Court, the rationale for the distinction was that 
regulations favoring government functions are more likely motivated 
by legitimate goals rather than ―simple economic protectionism.‖68 
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, further explained that the 
purpose of the traditional government functions inquiry is not to 
 
 63. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807. 
 64. Davis v. Revenue Cabinet, No. 03C103282, 2004 WL 5358776 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 30, 
2004), vacated sub nom., Davis v. Dep‘t of Revenue of Fin. and Admin. Cabinet, 197 S.W.3d 
557 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). 
The trial court based its finding in part on the market participant exception to the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Davis v. Revenue Cabinet, 2004 WL 5358776. Justice Souter‘s opinion for 
the Court also addressed the market participant exception. See infra note 67. 
 65. Davis v. Dep‘t of Revenue of Fin. and Admin. Cabinet, 197 S.W.3d at 562–64, rev’d 
sub nom. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). 
 66. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807–08. 
 67. Id. at 1811. Justice Souter‘s opinion for the Court also deemed the tax regulations 
nondiscriminatory on the basis of the market participant exception. Id. However, this reasoning 
was not joined by a plurality of the Court, and therefore is not addressed here. For a further 
discussion of the applicability of the market participation doctrine to the Davis case, compare 
Scott K. Attaway, Note, The Case for Constitutional Discrimination in Taxation of Out-of-State 
Municipal Bonds, 76 B.U. L. REV. 737, 758–61 (1996) (commenting that as a participant in the 
bond market, the state is permitted to favor resident bondholders by paying them higher rates of 
interest), with Ethan Yale & Brian Galle, Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause after United 
Haulers, 115 TAX NOTES 1037, 1040–41 (June 11, 2007) (concluding market participant 
exception does not apply because other participants in the bond market do not have the power 
to determine the taxable status of competitors‘ bonds). 
 68. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
342 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:329 
 
 
―draw fine distinctions among governmental functions,‖ 
distinguishing traditional from nontraditional functions.
69
 Rather, said 
Souter, the purpose is to determine whether the preference benefits 
private interests or benefits ―a government fulfilling governmental 
obligations.‖70 
After declaring the statute nondiscriminatory, the Court then 
declined to subject the Kentucky regulations to the Pike balancing 
test, deeming evaluation of the tax scheme a more appropriate role 
for Congress.
71
 In refusing to apply the Pike test, Justice Souter 
remarked,  
we are being asked to apply a federal rule to throw out the 
system of financing municipal improvements throughout most 
of the United States, and the rule in Pike was never intended to 
authorize a court to expose the States to the uncertainties of the 
economic experimentation the Davises request.
72
 
 
 69. Id. at 1810 n.9. 
 70. Id. Drawing this distinction was necessary in light of Court precedent in cases 
addressing federal regulations under the Commerce Clause. In a prior case, the Court held that 
the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to impose regulations upon the States ―in 
areas of traditional governmental functions.‖ Nat‘l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 
(1976). When the impracticability of discerning traditional from nontraditional government 
functions later became clear, the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Justice Souter‘s attempt to 
distinguish the test in Davis from that in National League of Cities, however, is not especially 
convincing. As argued by Daniel Ray:  
Despite the Court‘s assurances to the contrary, there is little reason to think that the 
traditional government functions rule in this context will not fall victim to the same 
problems it had time and again in the past. Depending on the Court‘s inclinations, 
traditional government functions may eventually describe something approaching a 
null set, or it may be a set with nearly limitless boundaries. The traditional government 
functions rule also tempts the Court to engage in policymaking under the cover of 
constitutional principles. A Court that is inclined to recalibrate the federal-state 
balance of power, or to act as an umpire judging whether various state activities hit the 
dormant Commerce Clause strike zone, will find traditional government functions to 
be a handy tool in the kit. 
Daniel R. Ray, Cash, Trash, and Tradition: A New Dormant Commerce Clause Exception 
Emerges from United Haulers and Davis, 61 TAX LAW. 1021, 1041 (2008). 
 71. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1819. 
 72. Id. Justice Souter also noted that leaving the question to Congress has two advantages: 
―Congress has some hope of acquiring more complete information than adversary trials may 
produce, and an elected legislature is the preferable institution for incurring the economic risks 
of any alteration in the way things have traditionally been done.‖ Id. This justification for 
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Unlike the Court in United Haulers, the Davis Court never 
considered how the tax scheme at issue would fare under the most 
palpable burden test. It made the traditional government functions 
exception dispositive, adopting wholesale the rule that regulations 
favoring state and local government are nondiscriminatory as long as 
those regulations treat in-state and out-of-state private business 
equally.
73
 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Davis opinion significantly weakened the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine. The dissent, at least, would have deemed the tax 
scheme invalid as discriminatory in purpose.
74
 But none of the 
Justices advocated application of the most palpable burden test, 
which has evolved as the most effective test to evaluate whether a 
state regulation has a discriminatory effect, thereby receiving a higher 
level of judicial scrutiny.
75
 Such high level scrutiny is warranted for 
discriminatory regulations because they are more likely than 
nondiscriminatory ones to undermine the objectives served by the 
Commerce Clause.
76
 What is unfortunate about the Davis opinion, as 
with the United Haulers opinion, is that the traditional government 
functions exception was entirely unnecessary. Application of the 
most palpable burden test reveals that the tax scheme was 
nondiscriminatory. 
At first glance, the scheme appears discriminatory, both on its 
face
77
 and because it influences investor behavior so as to cause 
 
leaving the tax scheme intact could have been used irrespective of the Court‘s ultimate 
determination of whether the tax was discriminatory. 
 73. Id. at 1811. 
 74. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, states in his dissent that the tax scheme is 
invalid under the line of cases instructing ―that laws with either the purpose or the effect of 
discriminating against interstate commerce to protect local trade are void.‖ Id. at 1824 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). He later states that ―Kentucky gives favored tax treatment to some 
securities but not others depending solely upon the State of issuance, and it does so to 
disadvantage bonds from other States.‖ Id. at 1825.  
 75. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.  
 76. Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).  
 77. See Conor J. Bennett-Ward, Note, Kentucky v. Davis: A Better Approach to Saving 
Differential Taxation of Municipal Bonds, 62 TAX LAW. 503, 515–16 (2009) (labeling 
Kentucky‘s tax scheme ―Discrimination Too Obvious to Ignore‖). 
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balkanization of the municipal bond market.
78
 The effectiveness of 
the scheme is readily apparent through an analysis of the bond fund 
market.
79
 Municipal bonds can be bought and sold on the secondary 
market through municipal bond funds. These funds are broken down 
into single state funds, designed to take advantage of both federal and 
in-state tax savings
80
 and national funds, which receive only the 
benefits of federal tax savings but offer a diversity of holdings from 
across the country.
81
 Purchasers of state-specific municipal bond 
funds are almost certain to be residents of the state where the fund is 
invested.
82
 
Between 1984 and 2007, the total municipal bond fund market 
grew from $20.79 billion to $373.84 billion of assets.
83
 Single state 
 
 78. See Brief for Respondents, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 26-28 (No. 06-666). Finding the 
tax discriminatory on these grounds would also be consistent with the Court‘s opinion in Boston 
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). In Boston Stock Exchange, the 
Court addressed a New York State transfer tax on securities transactions. Id. ―[T]ransactions by 
nonresidents of New York are afforded a 50% reduction . . . in the rate of tax when the 
transaction involves an in-state sale. Taxable transactions by residents (regardless of where the 
sale is made) and by nonresidents selling outside the State do not benefit from the rate 
decrease.‖ Id. at 324. Additionally, New York capped the total tax liability of any taxpayer for a 
transaction involving a New York sale but imposed the tax on out-of-state sales involving an in-
state transfer without limitation. Id. at 324–25. The Court deemed the tax invalid because it 
imposed greater tax liability on sales that occurred outside the state than on those that occurred 
inside the state. Id. at 331. In so holding, the Court found that the tax prevented tax-neutral 
decision making in the marketplace, encouraging sales at New York stock exchanges at the 
expense of out-of-state exchanges. Id. 
 However, Davis is distinguishable from Boston Stock Exchange on grounds beyond a mere 
distinction between favoring government rather than private enterprise. In Boston Stock 
Exchange, the differential tax is used to increase the volume of private sector transactions 
occurring in the state. The cost of the scheme is born primarily by the private sector of other 
states that witness a decline in transactions. Constituents within the state are unlikely to 
challenge the measure. In Davis, however, Kentucky‘s foregone tax revenues amount to the 
state paying effectively higher interest rates to borrow money from investors. See infra note 91. 
The costs, therefore, are principally born by the state‘s taxpayers. See infra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
 79. Bond funds are structured in such a way as to easily distinguish funds investing in a 
specific state versus on a national basis. As such, they provide the most reliable and readily 
available data about the manner in which state tax exemptions are influencing investor 
behavior. See Brief for the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, supra note 59, at 12. 
 80. See Yale & Galle, supra note 67, at 1038. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Investment companies caution investors that state-specific municipal bond funds are 
only appropriate for residents of that state. Id. 
 83. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 
113 (2008), http://www.ici.org/pdf/2008_factbook.pdf. 
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funds accounted for approximately twenty-three percent ($4.78 
billion) of the market share for municipal bond funds in 1984.
84
 By 
2007, that market share had grown to approximately forty-two 
percent ($155.83 billion).
85
 These data demonstrate that the perceived 
state tax benefits of municipal bonds make them popular among 
investors, who are drawn to the funds by the belief that the tax 
exemption improves their returns relative to the level of risk 
assumed.
86
 Put simply, money that would otherwise be flowing 
across state lines is being kept within the state.
87
 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Bond purchasers only benefit from the in-state tax savings inasmuch as the expected 
tax benefits do not result in an increase in the price or decrease in the yield of the bond. In an 
efficient market, the tax savings on municipal bonds would be fully capitalized into the price or 
yield of the bonds. In other words, those selling the bonds can demand a higher initial 
investment to reflect the additional value that the purchaser expects to receive in the form of tax 
benefits. With respect to the federal tax exemption for interest earned on municipal bonds, the 
tax benefits have not been capitalized into the bond yields. Investors have been able to derive 
interest earnings on municipal bonds in substantial excess of their federal income tax savings, a 
phenomenon commonly termed the ―muni puzzle.‖ See, e.g., John M. R. Chalmers, Default 
Risk Cannot Explain the Muni Puzzle: Evidence from Municipal Bonds that are Secured by U.S. 
Treasury Obligations, 11 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 281, 282 (1998). The data with respect to the state 
tax exemption for municipal bonds, however, are conflicting. A 1980s study of the primary 
market for municipal bonds indicated that the state tax benefits are not reflected in the bond 
yield, thereby giving investors better-than-market returns. See David S. Kidwell, Timothy W. 
Koch & Duane R. Stock, The Impact of State Income Taxes on Municipal Borrowing Costs, 37 
NAT‘L TAX J. 551 (1984). A later multiple regression analysis of the secondary market for 
municipal bonds found that one hundred percent of the in-state tax benefits are capitalized into 
the bond yields for municipal bonds. See C. Steven Cole, Pu Liu & Stanley D. Smith, The 
Capitalization of the State Tax Exemption Benefit in Municipal Bond Yields, 7 J. FIN. AND 
STRATEGIC DECISIONS 67, 73 (1994). To the extent that these findings are accurate, the in-state 
tax exemption would offer no benefits to a purchaser of municipal bonds in the secondary 
market. If those results can be extended to the primary market, the benefit for purchasers in the 
primary market would likewise be illusory. Whether illusory or real, however, investors believe 
the tax benefits are real and invest accordingly. 
 87. It is essentially impossible to determine which states benefit from this system and 
which states suffer. The only way to make that assessment would be to compare current bond 
purchases to the counterfactual scenario of bond purchases in a system without the tax scheme. 
If that comparison were possible, it would likely reveal that some states are able to find more 
buyers for their bonds, while others are able to find fewer. For instance, if New York‘s 
municipal bonds are inherently more attractive than Kentucky‘s, then Kentucky may be able to 
sell its bonds to Kentucky citizens who would otherwise be investing that money in New York 
bonds. New York, on the other hand, would lose the out-of-state investors who chose to invest 
in their home state. Ability to demonstrate such gains and losses would raise another interesting 
question. Would the tax scheme only be discriminatory in states that benefit from the system? 
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But the fact that the tax regime influences investor behavior, 
causing partial balkanization of the municipal bond market, is 
insufficient in and of itself to make the regulations discriminatory. 
Investors will not limit their investments to in-state municipal bonds, 
despite the tax benefits, because anyone familiar with basic 
investment principles will always pursue a diversified portfolio. More 
importantly, however, even though the tax regime discourages some 
degree of investment in out-of-state bonds, the costs of employing 
that system are actually born by the state and its citizens. In that 
respect, the regulations in Davis resemble those of United Haulers.
88
  
States contend that not taxing income from in-state municipal 
bonds helps them fund public projects by borrowing money from 
investors in the bond market at lower interest rates than would 
otherwise be available to them.
89
 That rationale only makes sense to 
the extent that a state‘s savings from reduced interest expenditures 
exceeds its foregone tax income. In fact, however, states incur greater 
losses of tax revenue than they save on reduced interest rates,
90
 and 
 
 88. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Brief of the National Ass‘n of State Treasurers, supra note 56, at 4. By issuing 
bonds, the government is borrowing money from bond purchasers and compensating those 
investors by paying them interest, just as if it had borrowed money from a bank or other lending 
institution. Granting a tax exemption to investors for that interest income permits the 
government to lower the interest rate on the bond. See supra note 56. 
 90. Taking the example from note 56, supra, suppose that a municipality in a state with an 
eight percent income tax rate issues a $1,000 bond to an investor when the prevailing market 
interest rate is ten percent. As already demonstrated, the state tax exemption for municipal 
bonds means the municipality can offer any interest rate above 9.2 percent and be more 
competitive than taxable bonds at the prevailing interest rate. If the municipality pays a 9.4 
percent interest rate, it will be able to pay the investor $94 in interest for one year, rather than 
the $100 it would have to pay to remain competitive without the state tax exemption. The 
municipality, therefore, has saved $6 in interest. But without the tax exemption, in which case 
the municipality would have to pay ten percent interest, the state could tax the bond purchaser 
on $100 of interest earned on the bond. With an eight percent tax rate, the state would have 
received $8 in tax revenues. Therefore, by granting the tax exemption, the state actually loses 
$2 (saving $6 in interest and losing $8 in tax revenues). Essentially, the tax exemption amounts 
to a state subsidy to the municipality in the form of foregone tax revenues. See also Cole, Liu & 
Smith, supra note 86, at 73 (―[T]he cost to the states in the form of lost tax revenues is 
significantly greater than the estimated benefit of reduced interest costs to in-state issuers.‖); cf. 
Alan D. Viard, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Balkanization of the Municipal Bond 
Market, 2 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 139, 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/ 
paper/26952 (―The interest rate on the state‘s bonds falls, but by less than the amount of the 
resident subsidy. State residents gain, because they earn a higher (subsidy-inclusive) return on 
home-state bonds. The state treasury incurs a net financial loss, as the cost of the subsidy 
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the tax scheme actually results in wasteful government spending.
91
 
Therefore, the tax deduction imposes a high cost on the state itself. 
That cost is passed on to taxpayers in the form of either higher taxes 
or reduced services.
92
 Because the costs of the tax scheme are born by 
 
outweighs the interest savings. The residents‘ gain is typically larger than the state treasury‘s 
cost, yielding a net within-state gain.‖). 
 91. The higher interest paid by the state as a result of the tax exemption is confounded by 
progressive state tax rates. As Patrick Fleenor, Chief Economist for the Tax Foundation, 
explains, in order to sell a sufficient number of bonds, the state must adjust interest rates to 
make them attractive to income levels below the highest tax bracket. See PATRICK FLEENOR, 
TAX FOUND., TAXING MORE TAKING LESS: HOW BROADENING THE FEDERAL TAX BASE CAN 
REDUCE INCOME TAX RATES 7 (2005). ―[T]here is no practical way of selectively selling bonds 
with different interest rates to investors in different tax brackets . . . .‖ Id. As a result, higher tax 
brackets receive even better returns. See id. Fleenor‘s report addressed the federal income tax 
exemption for municipal bonds, but the argument applies equally to states that apply a 
progressive tax rate, most of which do. See THE TAX FOUNDATION, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME 
TAX RATES, 2009, http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/228.html. 
 Extending the example from note 90, supra, consider a state with progressive taxation 
where the two highest tax brackets are six percent and eight percent. Assume that with no tax 
incentive, a $1,000 municipal bond would have to pay just above a ten percent return annually, 
or more than $100, to be more competitive than the prevailing market rate. However, with the 
deduction, individuals in the highest tax bracket (eight percent) would be willing to lend state or 
local governments funds for anything more than 9.2 percent (which would generate $92 interest 
income and tax savings of $8). But to attract those in the next highest bracket (six percent), the 
state would have to pay an interest rate of more than 9.4 percent (which would generate $94 
interest income and tax savings of $6). Therefore, if the state offers a 9.5 percent interest rate, it 
will save $5 in annual interest for every bond issued. For those bond purchasers at the six 
percent tax rate, the state will forego $6 in tax revenue, resulting in a net loss of $1. But for 
those at the eight percent tax rate the state will forego $8 in tax revenues, for a net loss of $3. 
 92. It could be argued that the costly implications of the tax scheme do not raise sufficient 
awareness to generate the necessary political restraints that would render the tax scheme 
nondiscriminatory. Some have used this argument to explain why the Court has permitted direct 
subsidies in favor of the local market while prohibiting tax breaks that operate to the same 
effect. As Dan T. Coenen remarks, ―subsidies have a heightened ‗political visibility‘ that puts a 
check on their perpetuation not applicable to tax exemptions. At a minimum, the annual 
revisitation of legislated subsidies should assure that the state interest supporting the program 
remains a keen one.‖ Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 481 (1989). However, the same rationale 
does not apply to the case of municipal bond tax exemptions. Whereas a tax break favoring the 
private sector may be viewed as a less visible subsidy, the tax exemption for municipal bonds 
actually generates a significant amount of wasteful government spending. See supra note 91. 
Such waste ought to produce heightened political awareness. Whether that heightened 
awareness is sufficient to generate the type of political check envisioned by the most palpable 
burdens test is perhaps a question of fact for the courts to address. Nonetheless, the tax regime 
at issue in Davis is certainly distinguishable from tax regimes favoring the private sector on 
those grounds. The existence of organizations like the Tax Foundation and others devoted to 
eliminating government waste should make the tax here nondiscriminatory. 
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all of the state‘s constituents, there is a sufficient in-state burden to 
make the regulations nondiscriminatory.
93
 
CONCLUSION 
The Kentucky tax scheme, shared by forty other states, is 
discriminatory on its face but not in effect. It does not actually place 
all the burdens outside the state while reserving all the benefits for 
inside the state. Granted, the tax regime is attractive to investors and 
causes some balkanization of the municipal bond market. The states, 
however, pay a significant cost to sustain the tax regime, because the 
tax revenues they forego exceed their savings from lower interest 
rates and result in government waste. That cost is born by every 
constituent within each state utilizing the scheme, in the form of 
either higher tax rates or reductions in services. 
Even if the tax scheme was discriminatory, the Court‘s concern 
that the scheme is designed to support important government 
functions could properly have been addressed by the Hunt balancing 
 
 For further discussion of the comparability of tax benefits and direct subsidies, see Edward 
A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998). 
 93. To the extent that paying higher interest rates to borrow money drives up the costs for 
other states to borrow money, that concern is represented by Kentucky residents whose tax 
dollars are likewise being used to pay above market interest rates. 
 Another argument to suggest that the tax scheme is nondiscriminatory is that investors, too, 
will put a political check on state legislators. That argument is not an especially strong one, but 
it would be articulated as follows: While the state imposes a tax on out-of-state bonds, it is in-
state investors who incur the tax. The significance of that fact is evidenced by the motives of 
the plaintiffs in Davis. George and Catherine Davis may have sued the Department of Revenue 
of Kentucky on Commerce Clause grounds, but their concern was not for the federal balance of 
power. Their objective was to obtain a refund of taxes collected on interest they earned from 
out-of-state bonds. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1807 (2008). The Davises were 
perfectly content to have Kentucky continue its tax exemption for in-state bonds. They simply 
wanted that exemption to extend to out-of-state bonds as well. 
 A troublesome question for the most palpable burden test, though, is what role perception 
plays in this analysis. To what extent is the tax scheme viewed by constituents as a tax 
exemption for in-state municipal bonds, and to what extent is the scheme perceived as an 
affirmative tax on out-of-state municipal bonds? If given the choice between having a tax on all 
municipal bonds and having a tax on only out-of-state bonds, constituents would certainly 
prefer the latter. But if the choice is between taxation of out-of-state municipal bonds or no 
taxation of municipal bonds whatsoever, they would again chose the latter. As with most tax 
exemptions, taxpayers likely view the scheme primarily as an exemption from what otherwise 
would be a general tax on all interest income from municipal bonds. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/11
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test for discriminatory state regulations. If the Court felt the state‘s 
fundraising interests outweighed the national interest in a unified 
national market for municipal bonds, it could have stated as much. 
Moreover, the Court could have argued that the statutory scheme is 
so pervasive that if Congress had wanted to put an end to the practice 
it would have legislated it out of existence.
94
 
Rather than take either of these approaches, the Court 
unnecessarily created a lower standard of review for all state 
legislation that can be construed as supporting government functions. 
Such a sweeping exception could have dramatic consequences for 
interstate commerce and the national market.
95
 At the very least, the 
exception will likely embolden states to enact legislation that they 
previously would not have due to concerns that their regulations 
might not withstand judicial scrutiny. The Court thus eliminated an 
important check on state legislatures for preserving the federal 
balance of power. Then again, perhaps shifting the federal balance of 
power was the very purpose of the Davis opinion. 
 
 94. One justification for the dormant Commerce Clause is that because the power to 
regulate interstate commerce is vested in Congress, its inaction on a particular matter means 
that Congress is exercising its desire to leave that matter unregulated. See supra note 11 and 
accompanying text. This approach prevents Congress from having to respond to every state 
legislative act that regulates interstate commerce in an undesirable manner. However, one could 
also argue the converse. When a regulation affecting interstate commerce is widespread among 
the states, Congress‘s silence can be interpreted as acquiescence and complacency. 
 95. See also Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (―The tax imposed here 
. . . . cannot be sustained unless the Court disavows the discrimination principle, one of the 
most important protections we have elaborated for the Nation‘s interstate markets.‖). 
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